In short
A penetration test in the healthcare sector involves launching authorized attacks on the systems of a hospital, clinic, laboratory, or medical software vendor to find vulnerabilities before cybercriminals do. The stakes are twofold: health data is considered sensitive under the GDPR, and an attack can disrupt patient care. According to ANSSI, once the entry point has been identified, the majority of ransomware attacks targeting healthcare facilities have entered through compromised VPN accounts: remote access points are the first thing to test. The sector is listed in Annex I of the NIS2 Directive, the French transposition of which is not scheduled to be enacted until October 2026.
Why Healthcare Is a Unique Target
A hospital cannot shut down. When its IT systems fail, it switches to degraded mode: in incidents handled by ANSSI, intensive care, pharmacy, laboratory, and imaging departments were the most affected, and access to electronic health records is very often disrupted as soon as the first containment measures are implemented. This pressure on the continuity of care makes healthcare facilities a lucrative target for ransomware groups.
| Indicator | Figure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Share of the healthcare sector in incidents and reports handled by ANSSI | 2.87% in 2020, 11.4% in 2023 | ANSSI, Healthcare Threat Assessment (November 2024) |
| Ransomware Attacks on Healthcare Facilities in 2022 and 2023 | 30 compromises involving encryption, representing 10% of the ransomware incidents reported to ANSSI during the period | ANSSI |
| Incidents reported to CERT Santé in 2025 | 764 incidents, reported by 606 facilities | ANS, 2025 Observatory (May 2026) |
| Ransomware attacks reported to CERT Santé | Down 30% between 2024 and 2025 | ANS |
| Reports from 2025 related to degraded operations or interruptions in patient care | 38% | ANS |
The decline in ransomware attacks does not mean the threat is diminishing. The ANS notes that more than half of the incidents reported in 2025 were of malicious origin, and that account compromises, data breaches, and banking scams (CEO fraud, fake wire transfer orders) are on the rise.
The Framework: GDPR, HDS Hosting, Reporting, NIS2
- GDPR: Health-related data constitutes a special category of data (Article 9). The CNIL classifies this as including, for example, an identifier assigned to an individual for health purposes, test results, medical history, or admission to a specialized hospital department. A data breach posing a risk to individuals must be reported to the CNIL within 72 hours.
- HDS Hosting: Anyone who hosts health data on behalf of a facility, a healthcare professional, or a patient must be certified as a health data host (Article L.1111-8 of the Public Health Code). Version 2.0 of the standards was published in the Official Journal on May 16, 2024; hosting providers already certified had until May 16, 2026, to comply with it.
- Incident Reporting: Healthcare and medical-social facilities must immediately report serious security incidents involving their information systems (Article L.1111-8-2 of the Public Health Code) via the portal operated by the Digital Health Agency (ANS) and its CERT Santé.
- NIS2: Healthcare is classified as a highly critical sector (Annex I of Directive 2022/2555), including healthcare providers, EU reference laboratories, pharmaceutical research and manufacturing, and manufacturers of medical devices deemed critical in the event of a public health emergency. The manufacture of other medical devices falls under Annex II.
- Medical devices: European Regulations 2017/745 (medical devices) and 2017/746 (in vitro diagnostics) include cybersecurity requirements that manufacturers must meet.
In France, NIS2 is to be transposed through the Resilience Bill. Adopted by the Senate on March 12, 2025, it was amended by the National Assembly’s special committee on September 10, 2025; the amended text explicitly mentions public healthcare facilities and social and medico-social institutions. In October 2026, the law has not been enacted: no NIS2 requirements are yet applicable under French law, but their content, as set forth in the directive, is known.
What to Test First
- Remote access: VPNs, Citrix-type gateways, remote desktops, and service providers’ remote maintenance accounts. ANSSI notes that the compromised VPN accounts belonged to service providers or staff members whose accounts were no longer in use.
- Email and identities: One-third of the incidents observed by ANSSI in healthcare facilities in 2022 and 2023 involved compromised email accounts. Multifactor authentication, password resets, and webmail exposure should be checked.
- Patient portals and appointment scheduling: Can a patient view another patient’s medical records, prescriptions, or appointments (IDOR)? Are account creation and password recovery processes secure against impersonation?
- Line-of-business applications and interconnections: electronic health records, laboratory software, imaging (PACS), and interfaces with software vendors and cloud platforms for appointment scheduling or image analysis.
- Active Directory and network segmentation: According to ANSSI, the need for high availability often results in systems lacking network segmentation or access controls, which makes widespread encryption of the network infrastructure more likely.
- Backups: ANSSI notes that they are often targeted—and sometimes deleted—to prevent data recovery. A compromised account must not be able to access them.
- Connected medical devices: These are often stuck on an outdated operating system and purchased without a security maintenance contract, notes ANSSI. They should be tested with caution, preferably on non-production equipment, in consultation with the biomedical department and the manufacturer.
Healthcare facilities, software vendors, and laboratories: different perspectives
| Player | Testing Priorities | What the report is intended to achieve |
|---|---|---|
| Hospitals, clinics, hospital groups | Remote access, Active Directory, email, and segregation between administrative, medical, and biomedical IT systems | Prioritize security patches and document digital risk management for senior management |
| Medical or telemedicine software publisher | Isolation between client institutions, APIs, professional authentication, and update mechanisms | Complete the healthcare facilities’ security questionnaires and demonstrate the product’s security |
| Laboratory (analytical or biological) | Results portal, interfaces with prescribers and automated systems, remote access for suppliers | Protecting results that are, by nature, health data |
| Health data hosting provider | Exposed infrastructure, isolation between clients, administration chain | Support the HDS certification process and vulnerability management |
A service provider’s security is also that of its clients: ANSSI reports that in January 2024, a ransomware attack on a French digital service provider offering telemedicine rendered its services unavailable to the healthcare facilities that relied on them.
Public Recommendations to Be Aware Of
- ANSSI: Its threat assessment for the healthcare sector (November 2024) concludes with 19 recommendations for healthcare providers: inventory of information systems, risk analysis, network segmentation, identity and access management, vulnerability management, logging, tested backups, and crisis preparedness.
- ANSSI services: automated auditing of Active Directory (ADS) directories and the SILENE service for assessing internet exposure, made available to numerous beneficiaries.
- CERT Santé (ANS): handling of reports, 24/7 incident response for healthcare facilities, audits of facilities’ internet exposure with a report containing recommendations, monitoring, and cybersecurity surveillance.
- PGSSI-S: The General Policy on the Security of Health Information Systems, led by the ANS, brings together the sector’s security standards.
- CaRE Program (2023–2027): The national Cybersecurity Acceleration and Resilience for Healthcare Facilities program supports healthcare facilities as they advance toward greater maturity.
These tools monitor external exposure or verify configurations; a penetration test goes a step further by demonstrating what an attacker can actually achieve once an account or access has been obtained. Sovra Recon conducts this type of test using AI agents, in a fully automated manner, either as a one-time audit (RAID) or as a continuous monitoring service (SENTINELLE).
Frequently asked questions
Is a penetration test mandatory for a healthcare facility?
No French legislation specifically mandates this by October 2026. However, the HDS framework and the NIS2 Directive—which is currently being transposed—require organizations to manage technical vulnerabilities and assess the effectiveness of security measures: a documented penetration test is one of the most direct ways to demonstrate this.
Is it possible to test a hospital without putting patients at risk?
Yes, provided the testing is properly structured: a written scope, non-destructive techniques, medical devices and critical systems excluded or tested outside of production environments, testing windows defined in coordination with the IT department, and a contact person available at all times.
Does a software vendor hosted by an HDS-certified hosting provider still need to have its application tested?
Yes. HDS certification pertains to hosting; it does not guarantee that the application prevents a user from accessing the data of another patient or another facility. That is the purpose of an application penetration test.
What should be done in the event of an incident at a healthcare facility?
Report the incident immediately via the ANS portal—where CERT Santé can assist healthcare facilities 24 hours a day—notify the CNIL within 72 hours if personal data is involved, and file a complaint.
Sources
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