Sovra Recon·Glossary · CSP

Content Security Policy (CSP): Definition, Directives, and Implementation

By Solan Barlet, co-founder of Sovra Recon
Updated October 29, 2026

In short

The Content Security Policy (CSP) is an HTTP header that tells the browser which content sources a page is allowed to load and execute: scripts, styles, images, frames, and connections. When properly configured, it blocks the execution of injected scripts and significantly reduces the impact of an XSS vulnerability. It complements data escaping in the code without replacing it, and is deployed gradually using a test mode that flags blockages without actually applying them.

Essential Directives

DirectiveWhat it controls
default-srcThe default value for unspecified resource types
script-srcAuthorized scripts: origins, nonces, or hashes
style-src, img-src, font-srcStyle sheets, images, and fonts
connect-srcDestinations for fetch, XHR, and WebSocket requests
frame-ancestorsSites authorized to display the page in a frame (clickjacking protection)
object-srcThe plugins (object, embed); set to 'none'
base-uriThe addresses authorized in the `base` tag, which an attacker can hijack to load relative scripts from their server
form-actionAuthorized destinations for form submissions
report-to, report-uriThe address to which the browser sends violation reports

A strict policy rather than a list of domains

A CSP based on a list of allowed domains can often be bypassed: a single overly permissive domain—such as a public CDN hosting exploitable libraries—is enough for an attacker. OWASP recommends a “strict” CSP based on nonces: each response generates a random value, which is added to legitimate script tags, and only those scripts execute.

Example of a strict policy: script-src 'nonce-{random value}' 'strict-dynamic'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'. The nonce value must change every time the page loads.

The 'unsafe-inline' keyword in script-src allows any inline script, including those injected by an attacker: it nullifies most of the protection against XSS. 'unsafe-eval' also weakens the policy.

Deploying a CSP Without Breaking the Site

  • Start with the Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only header: the browser reports violations without blocking anything.
  • Analyze the reports, adjust the policy (online scripts to be moved, third-party services to be authorized), and then switch to blocking mode.
  • Send the CSP in an HTTP header: certain directives, such as `frame-ancestors`, do not work in a `meta` tag.
  • Monitor reports after deployment to identify regressions and injection attempts.

Frequently asked questions

Is a CSP sufficient to prevent XSS?

No. It often blocks the execution of an injected script and limits what it can do, but the fundamental fix remains data escaping and the absence of raw HTML insertion. CSP is a second line of defense.

Can a CSP be defined in a meta tag?

Yes, using an `http-equiv` meta tag, but with limitations: the `frame-ancestors`, `report-uri`, and `sandbox` directives are not supported. The HTTP header remains the recommended method.

Sources

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